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ARE ORGANIZATIONS THAT PROVIDE FREE
LEGAL SERVICES ENGAGED IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW?
Wayne Moore*
If you are a director of a social service agency, a law school clinic, a
corporate pro bono program, the ACLU, a national support center
formerly funded by the Legal Services Corporation, or a similar cor-
poration that employs one or more attorneys as staff and has lay per-
sons on its board of directors, this could happen to you: A staff
attorney walks into your office and announces that he or she can no
longer represent clients (other than the corporation or its staff) for
fear that the organization would be engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law ("UPL") and that he or she would be aiding in the unau-
thorized practice of law. This happened to me.
Part of my management duties included overseeing a thirteen-attor-
ney litigation unit within the American Association of Retired Per-
sons (AARP), a section 501(c)(4) corporation,' governed by its Board
of Directors comprised entirely of non-lawyers. As an attorney, I re-
ported to a non-lawyer who, in turn, reported to the CEO of the
AARP who was also a non-lawyer. Prior to my assuming manage-
ment of this unit, the attorneys primarily drafted amicus curiae briefs
and, on occasion, represented the AARP as a plaintiff in public inter-
est litigation; neither of these activities constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law.2 We began planning, however, to represent third par-
ties such as AARP members or other elderly people in public interest
litigation. This new activity is not exempted from the UPL rules.
My first reaction to the staff attorney's statement was to protest that
all the unit's attorneys who represented third parties were licensed to
practice in the jurisdiction. Therefore, how could the unit be engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law?
The staff attorney cited a court rule that prohibits a corporation
from practicing law4 and In re Co-operative Law Co.,; a leading case
on the issue.
* Director of Legal Advocacy Group of the American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP) Foundation which operates a public interest litigation unit, a pro-
gram that provides technical assistance in designing and operating Legal Hotlines, a
discount legal services program for AARP members involving nearly 3000 lawyers in
private practice, and Legal Counsel for the Elderly, a full service legal aid office and
long-term care ombudsman program for older residents of the District of Columbia.
1. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. 111996) (granting tax-exempt status
to non-profit organizations that operate exclusively to promote social welfare).
2. See Rules of the D.C. Ct. App. Rule 49(c)(6) (1998) (exempting internal coun-
sel, who only advise his or her employer, from having to be members of the bar).
3. See id. Rule 49(c).
4. See id. Rule 49(a), (b)(1), (b)(2)(f).
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Rule 49(a) of the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals provides that "[n]o person shall engage in the practice of law in
the District of Columbia or in any manner hold out as authorized or
competent to practice law in the District of Columbia unless enrolled
as an active member of the District of Columbia Bar, except as other-
wise permitted by these Rules."'6 Rule 49(b)(1) defines "person" to
include a corporation.7 Rule 49(b)(2)(F) specifies that the practice of
law includes furnishing an attorney who practices law.8 The commen-
tary to Rule 49 states that the rule does not apply to referral services
but does not otherwise exempt non-profit organizations, except in lim-
ited circumstances not relevant here.9
Read together, these provisions literally say that a non-profit corpo-
ration that furnishes attorneys who practice law by offering services to
the public is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because the
corporation is not a member of the D.C. Bar.
The New York Court of Appeals ruled in In re Co-operative Law
Co. that a corporation that employed attorneys who represented
members of the public was engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law unless specifically exempted by rule or statute.10 The court rea-
soned that an attorney had the professional and ethical duty to be
subject solely to the direction of the client.1 As an employee, how-
ever, the attorney is also subject to the direction of the corporation,
which may conflict with the client's interest.12
I responded to the staff attorney that the case must be out of date.
Lawyers can now incorporate.' 3 Many of the law firms in town are
incorporated. The attorney replied that this is a result of special stat-
utes or court rules with which the AARP does not comply. 4 Gener-
ally, these provisions mandate that the corporation be subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the courts, such as by requiring all share-
holders, officers, and directors be admitted to the practice of law. 15
The AARP is not subject to the discipline of the courts.
5. 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910).
6. Rules of the D.C. Ct. App. Rule 49(a) (1998).
7. See id. Rule 49(b)(1).
8. See id. Rule 49(b)(2)(F).
9. See id. Rule 49 cmt.
10. See Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. at 16.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus, Corp. Law §§ 1501(b), 1503(a) (McKinney 1986) (permit-
ting and regulating the incorporation of law firms in New York). See generally Martin
M. Shenkman, Decisions: Choice of Entities for Law Firms, 7 N.J. Law.: Wkly. News-
paper 1683 (1998) (discussing reasons for choosing to incorporate a law firm).
14. See generally J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Practice by Attorneys and Physicians
as Corporate Entities or Associations Under Professional Service Corporation Statutes,
4 A.L.R.3d 383 (1966) (citing various professional service corporation statutes apply-
ing to attorneys).
15. See id. at 390. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 294-A:20 (1987) (requiring that
"not less than '/2 of the directors of a professional corporation and all the officers
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A quick review of the case law seemed to validate the staff attor-
ney's concern. A long line of cases dating prior to 1970 held that cor-
porations representing unrelated clients by means of attorney
employees were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law unless
specifically exempted from the law.16
Prior to the 1970s, the public generally obtained legal representa-
tion from lawyers in solo practice or lawyers participating in partner-
ships with other lawyers. All non-lawyers participating in these
practices were acting in support of the lawyers and under their direct
supervision. Profits from the practice of law were shared only among
lawyers. The Code of Professional Responsibility reflected this mode
of delivering legal services.
In the past twenty-eight years, however, there has been a revolution
in the methods of delivering legal services. This change has been led
by programs that serve low-income people. With the passage of the
Legal Services Corporation Act 7 in 1974, federally funded legal serv-
ices programs gradually began blanketing the country. The Act and
accompanying rules require that these programs be incorporated with
boards of directors consisting of some non-lawyers.' 8 The issue of the
unauthorized practice of law was raised with regard to legal services
programs, but is no longer a problem.1 9 This was resolved primarily
through explicit exceptions to the UPL statutes or rules20 or through
state statutes which created the legal services program. 21
Law school clinics began to proliferate in the 1970s. Law schools
recognized the need for law students to have some practical experi-
ence in the law before embarking on their own private practices.'
Many law schools, however, are part of larger universities that are
other than the secretary or an assistant secretary and the treasurer or an assistant
treasurer shall be qualified persons with respect to the corporation").
16. See People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 209 P. 363, 364 (Cal. 1922); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (Mass. 1935); Unger v. Landlords' Manage-
ment Corp., 168 A. 229, 231 (NJ. Ch. 1933); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Restric-
tions on Right of Legal Services Corporation or "Public Interest" Law Firm to
Practice, 26 A.L.RAth 614 passim (1983).
17. Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 2, 88 Stat. 381 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996 (1994).
18. See id. § 2996c(a).
19. See, e.g., Dixon v. Georgia Indigent Legal Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1156, 1166
(S.D. Ga. 1974), affd, 532 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting a claim of unauthorized
practice of law); Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 185 N.E.2d 566, 570-71 (Ohio Ct. App.
1962) (same); Scruggs v. Houston Legal Found., 475 S.W.2d 604, 605-07 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972) (same).
20. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292:1-a (1987); R.I. Gen. Lawvs § 11-27-18 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Carter v. Berberian, 434 A.2d 255,257 n.1 (R.I. 1981) (explaining that
Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc. was formed by a special act of the Rhode Island
General Assembly, Act of Feb. 28, 1969, Acts and Resolves of 1969 at 1425).
22. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Learning Through Work." An Empirical Study of
Legal Intership, 45 J. Legal Educ. 1, 4-7 (1995).
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incorporated and governed, at least in part, by non-lawyers. The
deans and trustees of universities are also likely to be non-lawyers.
Many social services agencies are hiring lawyers in order to provide
holistic services to their clients. For example, AIDS clinics, agencies
serving the homeless, and women's crises shelters are hiring one or
two lawyers for this purpose.' Most of these agencies are section
501(c)(3) corporations24 that are usually governed, at least in part, by
non-lawyers who have oversight responsibility for the lawyers.
An entire array of national public interest organizations that engage
in impact litigation, such as the ACLU, Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights, and former LSC-funded support centers may be subject to
challenge." Most of these programs are section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions with at least some non-lawyer board members.
Finally, many corporations have joined the pro bono movement by
allowing lawyers in their general counsels' offices to represent third
parties (usually indigent clients) on a pro bono basis. For example,
Ford Motor Company's Office of General Counsel has several com-
puters linked to the Legal Hotline for Older Michiganians.26 Once
connected to the Hotline computer through a modem, staff in the
General Counsel's Office provide legal advice to older people who
call the Hotline for help. Similarly, the Aetna Insurance Company
has operated a free clinic for seniors in Hartford, Connecticut for
many years.2 7
Because all the programs described above use attorneys who are
employees of a corporation which is governed, in part, by non-law-
yers, the specter lurks that the practice of law may be subject to the
control or interference of non-lawyers. Unfortunately, the law has not
kept up with these changes in delivery systems, resulting in the predic-
ament I faced in December of 1997.
A closer reading of the UPL cases reveals that there were several
issues that concerned the courts. In the leading case, In re Co-opera-
23. See, e.g., William J. Dean, Pro Bono Digest: A Guide to the City's Opportuni-
ties, N.Y. L.J., May 5, 1995, at 3 (describing The Door-A Center for Alternatives, a
program which offers comprehensive services to young people including legal advo-
cacy); William J. Dean, Pro Bono Digest: Highlights of the 1994 Conference, N.Y.
L.J., May 6, 1994, at 3 (providing an example of the holistic legal services offered to
AIDS patients).
24. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (granting tax-exempt status to certain types of
community or charitable organizations).
25. See, e.g., In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1059 (N.J. 1981) (re-
jecting a claim of unauthorized practice of law against one of the National Support
Centers formerly funded by the Legal Services Corporation).
26. See Corporate Counsel Association Elects Sara Holtz President, Liability
Week, Nov. 7, 1994 (reporting that Ford Motor Co. received the American Corporate
Counsel Association Foundation's Pro Bono Award for this legal hotline), available in
1994 WL 2541813.
27. Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, American Bar Ass'n, The Law
and Aging Resource Guide at CT-3, CT-4 (1992).
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tive Law Co., a company was formed to provide legal services. 8 The
Board of Directors hired attorney employees to deliver the services
and all profits inured to the benefit of the corporation's investors.2 9
The court held that the corporation violated the law which made it
"unlawful for any corporation to practice law, to render or furnish
legal services or advice, to furnish attorneys or counselors for that
purpose, or to advertise for or solicit legal business."-' The basis for
the court's decision was that
[t]he practice of law is not a business open to all, but a personal
right, limited to a few persons of good moral character, with special
qualifications ascertained and certified after a long course of study,
both general and professional, and a thorough examination by a
state board appointed for the purpose.3
1
The essence of this perception of the practice of law is the special duty
an attorney owes to his or her client. The court feared that the corpo-
ration's board or shareholders might try to interfere wvith the attorney-
client relationship. 2 Since the attorneys were employees, they were
subject to the control and direction of their employer. This created
the possibility that non-lawyer board members and shareholders
might attempt to influence the independent judgment of the lawyers.
Because the fees charged for the legal services belonged to the corpo-
ration, the corporation's interest in making a profit might diverge
from the attorney's primary purpose of aiding in the administration of
justice, a far higher calling.33 The court was truly concerned that the
money making interest of the corporation could prostitute the practice
of law.34 Also, the actions of the owners and governing body of the
corporation would be immune from the sanctions of censure or dis-
barment that govern lawyers, as a disbarred employee could simply be
replaced.
In the UPL cases involving corporations, the courts seem to look at
three things:
1. Are lay persons in a position to influence the legal judgment of
lawyers and can this actually occur? Examples of this are corpora-
tions that have lay persons on their board of directors or in the attor-
neys' supervisory hierarchy. 5
28. 92 N.E. 15, 15 (N.Y. 1910).
29. See id
30. Id
31. Id. at 16.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Using different approaches, Rules 1.8(e)(2) and 5.4 (c) of the D.C. Cir. Rules
of Professional Conduct prohibit lay interference with the exercise of a lawyer's pro-
fessional judgment. Cf. In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313. 317 (Mass. 1934)
(interpreting a UPL rule substantially similar to that of the Washington, D.C. Bar);
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2. Do fees derived from the attorneys' work fund the salaries and
expenses associated with the practice of law or do the fees generate
profits or fund activities or costs unrelated to the practice of law? 36
3. Is the corporation holding itself out as practicing law? Evidence
of this would include publicity which states that the corporation (as
opposed to its lawyers) represents third parties.37
I. LAY INTERFERENCE WITH THE INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT
OF LAWYERS
The first concern I examined was the role of lay persons in AARP's
litigation. The court in In re Education Law Center, Inc.38 ruled that
the Education Law Center ("ELC") was not engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of law because the board of directors, which did include
some lay persons, only set overall program priorities and did not make
decisions about individual cases.39 The ELC was, and presumably still
is, a section 501(c)(3) organization that did both legal and non-legal
work, but legal work predominated. 0 It did not charge clients for its
services and the financial status of the client was not a factor in the
selection of cases.4' Cases were taken solely on the basis of whether
they raised important educational issues.42 A Litigation Review Com-
mittee, composed entirely of attorneys from the Board, selected
cases.43 Once the case had been selected and an attorney-client rela-
tionship was established, the Litigation Review Committee had no
further involvement in the case. 4 Once the staff lawyer was retained,
the client's interests guided all decisions made by the lawyer even if
the law reform issues had "evaporated. 4n5 The retainer agreement ex-
plicitly stated that the ELC did not practice law or represent clients;
the client was represented by an attorney employee of the ELC.n6
The court agreed that there is a danger that the attorney employees
could be subject to pressures from the corporation which might inter-
Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp., 168 A. 229, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1933) (same).
36. Rule 5.4(a) of D.C. Cir. Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits attorneys
from sharing fees with a non-lawyer. Cf. In re Otterness, 232 N.W. 318, 319 (Minn.
1930) (interpreting a UPL rule that is substantially similar to that of the Washington,
D.C. Bar); People v. Lawrence Peska Assocs., 393 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (1977) (same).
37. See Rules of the D.C. Ct. App. Rule 49(a) (1998); cf People v. Association of
Real Estate Taxpayers, 187 N.E. 823, 826 (II1. 1933) (interpreting a UPL rule that is
substantially similar to that of the Washington, D.C. Bar); People v. People's Trust
Co., 180 A.D. 494, 497 (N.Y. 1917) (same).
38. 429 A.2d 1051 (N.J. 1981).
39. See id. at 1059.
40. See id. at 1054.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 1054-55.
46. See id. at 1055 n.3.
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fere with their attorney-client relationship. 7 The mere fact that the
ELC did not charge fees was not enough to exempt the ELC from the
UPL provisions. 8 On the other hand, the court recognized that the
special needs of public interest organizations may require them to in-
clude non-lawyers on their boards to represent community viewpoints
and provide expertise on non-legal matters.4 9 The court ruled that
considerations of public policy would allow such an arrangement if
certain rigorous standards were met: (1) the role of the corporation is
that of "a conduit or intermediary to bring the attorney and client
together";5" (2) "[o]nce a staff attorney is retained by a client, there
can be no interference in the attorney-client relationship by the organ-
ization";5 (3) "the corporation must be liable for any damages arising
from the attorney's malpractice; ' 52 (4) "[djeterminations of which
cases to accept and all decisions concerning how such cases are to be
handled" are made by lawyers, either on staff or the board;53 and (5)
the board "take[s] special precautions not to interfere with its attor-
ney's independent professional judgment in... handling [a] matter."'
The court said it is permissible for non-lawyers to participate in setting
broad policies about the litigation and use reasonable procedures to
review the attorneys' actions to insure they adhere to the boards' pol-
icy directives. 55
The court in In re New Hampshire Disabilities Rights Center, Inc.-
adopted a different approach. The Disabilities Rights Center
("DRC") was a non-profit organization funded by the federal govern-
ment to provide free legal services to developmentally and mentally
disabled persons.57 Some of its Directors or officers were non-law-
yers.58 Then writing for the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the
current U.S. Supreme Court Justice Souter cited a series of U.S.
Supreme Court cases59 for the proposition that the First Amendment
right to association includes the right to collectively undertake to ob-
47. See idt at 1055.
48. See id. at 1056.
49. See id. at 1058.
50. Id. (quoting Touchy v. Houston Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.
1968)).
51. In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d at 1058.
52. Id
53. Id
54. It at 1059 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 324 (1970)).
55. See id at 1058 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 324 (1970)).
56. 541 A.2d 208 (N.H. 1988).
57. See id at 209.
58. See id at 211.
59. See id at 212-13 (citing Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967); Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963)).
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tain meaningful access to the courts.6 ° Judge Souter used this right to
authorize the DRC to represent disabled persons who were not
poor.6' The only relevant exception to New Hampshire's UPL statute
was a provision that allowed corporations to provide legal services to
the poor.62 Judge Souter ruled that this exception did not apply to the
DRC, but that the DRC had a separate constitutional right to serve
those disabled persons who were not poor.63 The rationale used by
Judge Souter seems a bit contrived. The U.S. Supreme Court cases
that he cited applied to individuals whose associational rights arose
from their membership in their union.6' The DRC served the general
public and did not limit its services to members.65
In applying the above guidance to our own situation, we felt that
the litigation unit should be moved from the AARP to the AARP
Foundation, which is a section 501(c)(3) corporation affiliated with the
AARP. The purpose of the AARP Foundation is to carry out certain
charitable activities other than legislative lobbying, and to use govern-
ment and foundation grants to carry out important programs for older
people; the AARP Foundation receives a substantial portion of its in-
come from the AARP. The transfer was made to clearly separate liti-
gation activities from the legislative and public policy activities of the
AARP which could be perceived as having the potential to influence
the conduct of litigation.
The AARP Foundation, located in the District of Columbia, is gov-
erned by a non-lawyer Board of Directors and is administered by a
non-lawyer who is my direct supervisor. I am the head of the newly
formed AARP Foundation Litigation unit ("AFL") and am admitted
to practice in D.C.
We interpreted In re Education Law Center to allow this new ar-
rangement so long as the five conditions above were strictly fol-
lowed.66 Therefore, a special charter was prepared for the litigation
unit.67 The charter provides that the mission of the litigation unit is
"to conduct high visibility litigation to benefit AARP members and to
pursue law reform litigation in promoting the welfare of older persons
in AARP strategic issue areas. ' 68 Like in the ELC case, the financial
status of the client is not important. Cases are selected on the basis of
whether they raise important issues, benefit a large number of older
people, or give visibility to a problem faced by many older people.69
60. See id. at 213.
61. See id. at 213-14.
62. See id. at 210-11.
63. See id. at 215-16.
64. See id. at 212-13.
65. See id. at 214.
66. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
67. See Charter of AARP Foundation Litigation (1998) (on file with the author).
68. Id. art. II.
69. See id. art. III, § 1.
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The AFL also educates the public and conducts other legal advocacy
but does not lobby.7"
Like the ELC, the AARP Foundation Board and non-lawyer ad-
ministrator set the AFL's litigation priorities. 7 1 Specifically, the
AFL's litigation must primarily focus on age discrimination in employ-
ment, pensions and other employee benefits, consumer fraud includ-
ing predatory lending, and health and long-term care issues. The
charter provides, however, that no attorney of the AFL shall permit
any person outside of the AFL to interfere with or attempt to influ-
ence his or her independent professional judgment regarding selec-
tion, management, or progression of a case once an AFL attorney has
been retained by a client.72 Furthermore, the AARP Foundation is
liable for any damages arising from an AFL attorney's malpractice
and maintains malpractice insurance for this purpose. Thus, the AFL
charter squarely addresses conditions (2), (3), and (5) above.Z3
The AARP Foundation Board and non-lawyer administrator can:
(1) monitor whether the AFL is following the litigation priorities; (2)
approve performance requirements and monitor whether they have
been achieved; and (3) supervise and evaluate staff so long as they do
not try to influence decisions that can properly be made only by an
attorney.7 4 This is consistent with the non-lawyer governance allowed
by the court in the ELC case.'
The role of persons outside of the AFL in the selection of cases and
in bringing the attorney and client together was more problematic
(i.e., conditions (1) and (4) above).76 The AARP Foundation Board
established a conflict checking process which, in addition to checking
for conflicts that all lawyers must avoid, also checks whether: (1) the
AFL's position in a case is contrary to the AARP's or the AARP
Foundation's public policy, or (2) the case involves a defendant that
either provides benefits to AARP members or is an ally of the AARP
or the AARP Foundation in achieving other public policy goals.'
These two conditions reflect broad policy directives that define the
types of cases that AFL can handle within its priority issue areas.
These policies seem reasonable. A public interest law firm should not
have to advocate a position that is contrary to its public policy posi-
tions. For example, the AFL should not have to represent an em-
ployer who is accused of age discrimination, if the AARP's policy is to
support employees who allege they are victims of age discrimination.
70. See id art. III, § 2. The ELC also conducts non-legal and other legal activities.
See In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1054 (NJ. 1981).
71. See Charter of AARP Foundation Litigation art. IV, § 7.
72. See id. art. IV, §§ 8, 9; id. art. V, § 3.
73. See supra notes 51, 52, 54 and accompanying text.
74. See Charter of AARP Foundation Litigation art. IV, § 7 (1998).
75. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 50, 53 and accompanying text.
77. See Charter of AARP Foundation Litigation art. IV (1998).
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Furthermore, the AFL should not be allowed to sue the AARP, the
AARP Foundation, or their allies or partners when the AARP Foun-
dation and the AARP are providing most of its funding.
Because AFL staff are not always aware of all of the AARP's and
the AARP Foundation's policy positions, partners, and allies, the con-
flict check process requires the AFL to check with key staff of the
AARP Foundation and the AARP to determine whether a case vio-
lates either of these key considerations. This conflict-check process
must, however, be conducted carefully so as to avoid running afoul of
other ethical considerations.
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in
Formal Opinion 324, considered the issue of whether the board of a
legal services program that included non-lawyers could review individ-
ual cases to determine which cases staff attorneys could handle.7" The
Committee found this practice to be unethical.79 The executive com-
mittee of a metropolitan bar association wanted to impose a condition
on a local legal services agency that its attorneys could not represent
an organization unless approved by its board.8" The executive com-
mittee was trying to prevent the program from representing certain
controversial organizations.8'
Although the focus of the ABA Ethics Committee's opinion was on
the board's potential bias and not on the unauthorized practice of law,
the opinion is still useful for our purposes. The ABA Ethics Commit-
tee opined that the board can set financial and similar eligibility crite-
ria that clients must meet, allocate available resources and manpower,
and determine the types or kinds of cases that could be handled and
the types of clients who could be represented-all of which it defined
as broad policy considerations.8' Also, they said the board can em-
ploy reasonable procedures to insure that its broad policies are carried
out.83 This can include asking staff attorneys to provide the board
with certain information about their clients and cases.84
The board, however, could not choose cases or clients on a case-by-
case basis because of the danger that the selection would not be made
on the merits of the case but based on whether such representation
might engender criticism from certain influential segments of the com-
munity. This would be an improper interference with the staff attor-
ney's professional judgment by a person who employs the lawyer to
represent another and would foreclose justice to the very people the
78. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 324
(1970).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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program was intended to represent.' The Committee also made it
clear that once an attorney began representing the client, the board
could not interfere with the attorney's independent professional judg-
ment.87 Note that the court in the ELC case did say that a board-
appointed committee comprised entirely of lawyers from the board
and/or the staff could make case-by-case decisions about which impact
cases a program should handle.'
The opinion suggests the AFL's conflict check must be carefully ad-
ministered. 9 So long as the AFL uses a fact gathering process to de-
termine if a case falls within the board's broad guidelines and the
mission of the program, the process is probably ethical. Should those
outside of the AFL, however, attempt to challenge the acceptance of a
case based on whether the case can be won, the nature or reputation
of the represented parties, the strategy to be used, or a similar issue,
this would surely be an attempt to influence judgments that only the
client's attorney should make.
An issue that seems to fall within the gray area of Ethics Opinion
324 is whether the conflict check process may review the risk the liti-
gation poses to the success of concurrent strategies being conducted
by other units within the AARP or the AARP Foundation. For exam-
ple, what if the litigation may undermine sensitive negotiations or lob-
bying efforts in which the AARP is engaged? This issue could be
framed as a broad policy issue, specifically that litigation should not be
pursued if the AARP or the AARP Foundation believes that another
strategy should be tried first. The AARP has had success negotiating
or lobbying before resorting to litigation. On the other hand, it is im-
portant that this conflict-check process is not used by those outside of
the AFL to control case selection on a case-by-case basis.
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES BENEFITING THE CORPORATION
The second important issue in UPL cases concerns how attorneys'
fees are handled.9" While the AFL does not charge its clients attor-
neys' fees, it will seek statutory fees and market-rate attorneys' fees
from the opposing party.
The court in In re Otterness9' ruled that a corporation owned and
managed, at least in part, by non-lawyers could not benefit from attor-
neys' fees received by a staff attorney for the representation of third
86. See id
87. The Committee said it might be proper for the board to require its approval
before a particular case is expanded into a class action where class actions are not a
primary goal of the program. This would not be allowed, however, in cases like AFL
where this type of litigation is the primary goal of the program.
88. See In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1058 (NJ. 1981).
89. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 324
(1970).
90. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
91. 232 N.W. 318 (Minn. 1930).
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parties.92 The case involved a bank that hired a lawyer to serve as
Vice President.93 Part of the lawyer's duties was to foreclose mort-
gages on behalf of customers of the bank.94 Attorneys' fees from
these cases went to the bank.95 The court held that for the bank to
employ an attorney to practice law for others, for the benefit and
profit of the bank, amounted to the unauthorized practice of law. 96
Formal Opinion 95-392 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility explains the basis for prohibiting a corpora-
tion from benefiting from the fees received by an attorney
employee. 97 This case involved a for-profit corporation that did not
generate enough legal work to keep its in-house counsel busy.98 It
wanted to "rent" these attorneys out to third parties who would be
charged more than the cost to the corporation of employing the law-
yers.99 The corporation planned to retain these profits. 100 The Com-
mittee said this arrangement would violate Rule 5.4 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct which prohibits the sharing of fees with
a non-lawyer.' 0a The Committee feared that if the corporation prof-
ited from the attorneys' representation of third parties, the non-law-
yer management of the corporation would have an incentive to select
the matters the lawyers undertake, determine the amount of time the
lawyers spend on these matters, and decide the fees that should be
charged for these services.10 2 The Committee said that these are deci-
sions lawyers should make and, if made by a lay person, would consti-
tute improper interference with a lawyers' professional judgment.1 0 3
In other words, there would be a risk of "transforming the practice of
law into an ordinary commercial business, with the resulting un-
restricted emphasis on the hard sell and the bottom line."'' The
Committee said the arrangement would be ethical if the fees charged
were only those necessary to reimburse the corporation for its costs of
employing the lawyers. 105
Similarly, the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, in Formal Opinion
135, ruled that a for-profit corporation can allow employee attorneys
92. See id. at 319.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 319-20.
97. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 392
(1995).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id. (quoting Roy D. Simon, Jr., Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Inter-
est Groups, 98 Yale L.J. 1069, 1132 (1989)).
105. See id.
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to represent third parties for a fee so long as the fees only compensate
the lawyer and the lay staff he or she supervises in performing legal
work."°6 In addition, other non-lawyers must not be compensated or
otherwise profit from the fees. 0 7
Non-profit organizations, however, are allowed to collect more in
attorneys' fees than the amount necessary to reimburse their costs. In
ABA Formal Opinion 93-374, the Committee ruled that the concerns
subsequently addressed in ABA Formal Opinion 95-392 do not exist
when the corporation is not for profit and the fees are court awarded
(i.e., awarded by virtue of fee-shifting statutes or paid by the opposing
party).' The opinion considered the situation where an attorney
worked for a pro bono organization whose membership or governing
body was not solely composed of lawyers. 0 9 The Committee did not
feel that attorneys' fees in these circumstances created a significant
incentive for non-lawyers to interfere with the lawyers' independent
judgment. 10 First, the attorneys' fees would only be awarded if the
attorney employee prevailed in the matter; second, the fees were not
paid by the client; and third, the court supervision of the fee award
would insure the fees would be fair. These factors create significant
barriers to a non-lawyer whose intent is to maximize fees by selecting
cases, controlling the progress of the litigation, or setting fees. The
Committee felt that a separate prohibition in the Model Rules against
lay interference with a lawyer's independent judgment"' was suffi-
cient for a staff lawyer to resist any such interference from lay man-
agement, particularly where the lawyer was not directly dependent on
the fees for his or her salary. 1 2
The Committee said the prohibition on fee sharing was also in-
tended to reduce the incentive for non-lawyers to engage in the uneth-
ical solicitation of cases, as non-lawyers are not subject to the
discipline of the courts for such transgressions.13 The Committee,
however, cited case law which allows lawyers and non-lawyers acting
on behalf of non-profit public interest organizations more leeway in
soliciting cases than for-profit entities as an indication that unethical
solicitation is not as great a concern with public interest entities.'14
The Committee felt the prohibition on fee sharing was also in-
tended to discourage excessive fees. 15 But as discussed above, that is
106. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 135 (1984).
107. See id.
108. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 374
(1993).
109. See id
110. See id.
111. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(c) (1998).
112. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 374.
113. See id.
114. See id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)).
115. See id
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not a concern in court-awarded fees or fees agreed to by the parties in
a settlement.' 16 The prohibition was also intended to reduce the in-
centive for non-lawyers to refer cases to incompetent lawyers who
might be willing to share a larger portion of the fee. 117 Yet, consider-
ing that fees are awarded only if the attorney prevails, and incompe-
tent attorneys are less likely to prevail, the Committee felt that this
concern is minimal, particularly where the attorney is an employee of
the organization governed by the non-lawyer.118
Thus, numerous courts have awarded attorneys' fees to non-profit
organizations for legal services performed by staff.119 In the rare case
where the receipt of fees by a non-profit organization controlled, in
part, by lawyers was held to constitute the unauthorized practice of
law, the court found the non-profit structure to be a fiction that
masked the general practice of law for fee-paying clients. 120 The
courts have ruled that non-profit, public-interest groups may receive
fees based on the market-rate value of the services rendered and not
merely on the cost to the corporation of employing the attorneys.1 2 1
In the case where the organization furnishing legal services is con-
trolled, in part, by non-lawyers and also conducts other activities, mar-
ket-rates are allowed so long as all fees are put into a fund used
exclusively for litigation.122 The rationale for allowing legal aid orga-
nizations and public interest law firms to receive market rate fees is
that many of the fee shifting statutes provide for the payment of mar-
ket-rates and courts have found no basis in their legislative history for
using a cost-based approach or for distinguishing based on the nature
of the entity receiving the fees. 123
Courts extend this same policy to organizations like the AARP
Foundation because their litigation units provide the same services
116. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
117. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 374.
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 723 F.2d 45, 48-49 (8th Cir. 1983)
(affirming an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 regardless of fundrais-
ing efforts by the legal services organization); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1139, 1154 (2d Cir. 1983) (adjusting the amount
of an award of attorney's fees awarded to non-profit lawyers); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617
F.2d 163, 165 n.3, 168-69 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that "a legal aid organization merits
an attorney's fee fully as much as does a private attorney").
120. See, e.g., Carter v. Berberian, 434 A.2d 255, 257 (R.I. 1981) (holding that pub-
lic censure of an attorney was warranted because the purported non-business corpora-
tion should have been incorporated as a professional-service corporation).
121. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-96 (1984) (awarding market-rate
fees).
122. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 3882 v. Federal Labor Rela-
tions Auth., 944 F.2d 922, 934-35 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Jordan v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 516 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Ethics Comm., District of
Columbia Bar, Op. 176 app. (1986) (listing Federal Circuit Court decisions allowing
the award of attorneys' fees at market rates).
123. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 894-96.
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and have the same mission as these other public interest entities.
Therefore, so long as the money is earmarked solely for use by the
litigation unit, the circumstances of organizations like the AFL are
identical to that of legal aid organizations.
The courts in D.C. go further by allowing the parent organization to
divert money it would otherwise give to the litigation unit, thus requir-
ing the unit to draw on its litigation fund instead.124 Thus, the non-
legal activities and staff of a non-profit organization are allowed to
profit from attorneys' fees in the sense that they no longer have to
fund the litigation unit from sources other than attorneys' fees. The
court in Local 3882 reasoned that the case law already allows a non-
profit corporation to benefit from attorneys' fees received by its em-
ployee attorneys by allowing it to recoup its costs; therefore, the size
of the recoupment should not matter and the non-profit corporation
should be allowed to recoup the market rate instead of its out-of-
pocket costs.'25
The D.C. Bar's Legal Ethics Committee was slightly more persua-
sive in its rationale for this policy. They said that the D.C. Court of
Appeals chose not to adopt the ABA's Model Disciplinary Rule 2-
103(D) which prohibited certain lay organizations from profiting from
recommending legal services to an individual in need of legal assist-
ance.'26 They used this omission to interpret DR 3-102, which prohib-
its sharing a fee with a non-lawyer. 2 7 Reading these rules together,
the Committee found that non-profit umbrella lay organizations that
have a public interest litigation unit can profit from attorneys' fees so
long as the funds are not shared with the umbrella organization.'
When the fees are segregated and cannot be used by the lay organiza-
tion, the fees are not literally shared, even though the lay organization
may benefit by not having to spend as much money on its litigation
unit.'2 9 The Committee did not believe this would encourage lay per-
sons to influence the judgment of lawyers, particularly when the um-
brella organization and the third parties that the organization serves
share the same interests. 30 (This view would support the AARP
Foundation's policy to only accept cases for litigation which support
its public policies.) Finally, the Committee said that many of the fed-
eral fee shifting statutes require that the fees be set at market-value
rates.'3 ' Thus, to prohibit non-profit organizations from accepting
124. See Local 3882, 944 F.2d at 934-35.
125. See i at 936.
126. Legal Ethics Comm., District of Columbia Bar, Op. 176 (1986).
127. See id
128. See id
129. See id
130. See id.
131. See id.
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market rates would "create a conflict between federal law and ethical
requirements." 32
To address these concerns, all attorneys' fees received by the AFL
are separately accounted for. All fees received plus any earnings from
interest or investments must only be used for the expenses of the
AFL. None of these fees can go into the general operating account or
reserves of the AARP or the AARP Foundation. The AARP Foun-
dation and the AARP, however, can reduce its funding for the AFL
and require the AFL to rely on its litigation funds.
III. A CORPORATION HOLDING ITSELF OUT AS PRACTICING LAW
The third consideration mentioned above is that a corporation can
not hold itself out as practicing law. 133 This consideration arises from
the wording that is used in most UPL provisions.13 4 While few UPL
decisions are based solely on this ethical violation, it is sometimes
cited along with one of the two prime considerations 135 as evidence of
UPL activity.136 An example of this violation would be publicity that
states that the corporation provides legal services.'3 7 In drafting
brochures, web sites, press releases, or any other statement about the
AFL, care must be taken to avoid a declaration that the AFL provides
legal services. Rather, the text should read that AFL lawyers provide
legal services. Caution dictates that explicit language should be added
stating that the AFL does not practice law, but attorneys employed by
the AFL do.
Similarly, the client retainer agreement should state that the client
is being represented by specifically named attorneys and not by the
AFL. This creates a potential inconvenience if an attorney leaves the
AFL and must be replaced by another. Generally, this substitution
will require a motion approved by the court if the case is already in
litigation; this would not be required if the client were represented by
an entity such as an incorporated law firm.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Rules of the D.C. Ct. App. Rule 49(a) (1998) ("No person shall ... in
any manner hold out as authorized or competent to practice law in the District of
Columbia unless enrolled as an active member of the District of Columbia Bar ..
The term "person" includes corporations).
135. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Carter v. Berberian, 434 A.2d 255, 256 (R.I. 1981) (stating that the
findings of facts included a finding that the organization "offered to perform legal
services").
137. See, e.g., People v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 187 N.E. 823, 826
(Ill. 1933) (stating that respondent, through its advertisements, held itself out to the
public as practicing law).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The concept of the unauthorized practice of law is outdated insofar
as it applies to entities that provide free legal services. UPL statutes
should be drafted so it is clear that they do not prohibit non-profit,
public-interest organizations with lay persons in management or on
their boards from employing attorneys to represent third parties in
public interest litigation.
That an organization provides free legal services reduces the great-
est concern that courts have about unauthorized practice, namely the
fear that the law will be used to generate profits for non-lawyers, in-
stead of access to justice for clients.
The existing ethical rules are perfectly adequate to control any pos-
sible transgressions by a free legal services program. Model Rule
5.4(a), which prohibits the sharing of attorneys' fees with non-lawyers,
is sufficient to insure that any attorneys' fees received by the non-
profit organization from fee shifting statutes or opposing parties is not
shared with non-lawyers.' 38 Model Rules 1.8(0 and 5.4(c), which in
different ways prohibit non-lawyers from interfering with the in-
dependent judgment of a lawyer, protect attorney employees from
wrongful interference by lay management or board members of the
non-profit organization.
139
As the case law discussed in this Article shows, the application of
UPL to public interest litigation groups is analogous to an analysis
based on Rules 1.8(f), 5.4(a), and 5.4(c). Thus, the UPL concept as it
applies to free legal services programs is redundant and unnecessary.
In summary, innovative methods of increasing access to legal services
should not be constrained by outdated UPL rules.
138. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(a) (1998).
139. See id. Rules 1.8(f), 5.4(c).
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